Here are the all-to-common facts.\u00a0 \u201cLucy and Manatu Vuki lost their Buena Park home to foreclosure. The sale took place October 7, 2009, with their erstwhile lender, HSBC Bank USA<\/a> (HSBC), as the buyer at the foreclosure sale . . . On April 6, 2010, the Vukis filed this state court action against HSBC for, among other things, statutory violation of Civil Code sections 2923.52 and 2923.53.\u201d<\/p>\n The court was essentially compelled to rule against the borrowers because \u201cof the operation of section 2923.54.\u00a0 Subdivision (b) of that statute is clear that: \u2018Failure to comply with Section 2923.52 or 2923.53 shall not invalidate any sale that would otherwise be valid under Section 2924f.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n That\u2019s a shame, because we have a legislative mandate to protect borrowers from over-reaching<\/a>, but no effective manner of recourse.\u00a0 Still, the borrowers should have been able to maintain an action for wrongful foreclosure, even if they could not invalidate the sale.<\/p>\n As the court held, \u201cThis argument fails since any claim which the Vukis might have to invalidate the foreclosure sale based on sections 2923.52 and 2923.53 necessarily entails a private right of action which the statutes do not give them.\u201d<\/p>\n Explained the court, \u201cCivil Code section 2923.52 imposes a 90-day delay in the normal foreclosure process . . . After the enactment of section 2923.52, at least for certain loans, another 90 days must be included \u2018in order to allow the parties to pursue a loan modification to prevent foreclosure.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n The court explained that \u201cthe requirements are a matter of a general program, evaluated by regulatory commissioners . . . Everything in the exemption process, in short, is funneled through the relevant commissioner, [to wit] (1) The Commissioner of Corporations for licensed residential mortgage lenders and servicers and licensed finance lenders and brokers;\u00a0 (2) The Commissioner of Financial Institutions for commercial and industrial banks and savings associations and credit unions; and (3) The Real Estate Commissioner for licensed real estate brokers servicing mortgage loans.\u201d<\/p>\n In the court\u2019s analysis, the statute could not be enforced by the debtor<\/a>.\u00a0 \u201cSection 2923.54 first imposes a requirement that a notice of sale give information about whether the servicer has, or has not, obtained an exemption from the 90-day delay provisions of section 2923.52.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cBut then section 2923.54 makes clear that whatever else is the case as regards actual compliance or noncompliance with sections 2923.52 and 2923.53, it will not invalidate any otherwise valid foreclosure sale\u201d<\/p>\n The court conclusively ruled against the debtors, stating that \u201cThe argument fails because, as shown above, any noncompliance with sections 2923.52 and 2923.53 is entirely a regulatory matter, and cannot be remedied in a private action<\/strong>. The statutory scheme contains no express or implied exceptions for any lender who buys property knowing that it may not have complied with sections 2923.52 and 2923.53.\u201d<\/p>\n I\u2019m not keen on all the legislative tinkering with the foreclosure process.\u00a0 It\u2019s just sticking a finger in the dam<\/a> \u2013 it doesn\u2019t address the underlying problems, including the apparent wilful failure of lenders to renegotiate loans in good faith.<\/p>\n![\"Yosemite](\"http:\/\/www.krbecheklaw.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/12\/Yosemite-Chapel.jpg\" "\\"Fresno")
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