{"id":764,"date":"2012-01-10T11:09:26","date_gmt":"2012-01-10T18:09:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/fiduciarydutiesblog.com\/?p=764"},"modified":"2012-01-10T11:09:26","modified_gmt":"2012-01-10T18:09:26","slug":"l-s-sealy-categories-of-fiduciary-duties","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/?p=764","title":{"rendered":"L.S. Sealy &#8211; Categories of Fiduciary Duties"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In a law review article published 50 years ago, Cambridge law professor <a href=\"http:\/\/www.law.cam.ac.uk\/people\/academic\/ls-sealy\/73\">L.S. Sealy<\/a> reviewed two centuries of English case law on fiduciary relationships.\u00a0 He concluded, correctly, that different relationships give rise to different duties.<\/p>\n<p>As a starting point, \u201cFletcher Moulton L.J. once warned against what he called \u2018the danger of trusting to verbal formulae\u2019 in this way. After illustrating a number of fiduciary situations and describing the ways in which the courts had interfered to grant relief in these cases, he said:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThereupon in some minds there arises the idea that if there is any fiduciary relation whatever any of these types of interference is warranted by it.\u00a0 <strong>They conclude that every kind of fiduciary relation justifies every kind of interference.\u00a0 Of course that is absurd<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The nature of fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference.\u00a0 It is obvious that we cannot proceed any further in our search for a general definition of fiduciary relationships. We must define them class by class, and find out the rule or rules which govern each class.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/fiduciarydutiesblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/01\/Austria.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-765\" title=\"Fresno real estate lawyers\" src=\"http:\/\/fiduciarydutiesblog.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/01\/Austria.jpg\" alt=\"Austria\" width=\"500\" height=\"325\" \/><\/a>Such statement is too often ignored by lawyers and judges alike.\u00a0 Consider this further analysis:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cFry J.&#8217;s definition emphasises the essential quality of all fiduciary relationships: every remedy which can be sought against a fiduciary is one which might be sought against a trustee on the same grounds.\u00a0 But it is really not a definition at all: although it describes a common feature, it does not teach us to recognise a fiduciary relationship when we meet one.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cStill less does it assist us when we are faced with a particular relationship and asked the practical question: does a certain principle of the law of trust and trustee apply?\u00a0 John is my agent and is therefore, on good authority, in a fiduciary position towards me.\u00a0 Does this mean that he must not mix with his own money the sums which he holds on my account?\u00a0 Is there a presumption of undue influence if I make him a gift?\u00a0 Is he disqualified from becoming the lessee of land formerly held by me, after I have failed to secure a renewal of the lease for myself?\u00a0 Do all the trust principles apply to this fiduciary situation?<\/p>\n<p>\u201c<strong>When we examine the authorities, we learn &#8211; perhaps with some surprise &#8211; that this is not so. The word \u2018fiduciary,\u2019 we find, is not definitive of a single class of relationships to which a fixed set of rules and principles apply<\/strong>.\u00a0 Each equitable remedy is available only in a limited number of fiduciary situations; and the mere statement that John is in a fiduciary relationship towards me means no more than that in some respects his position is trustee-like; it does not warrant the inference that any particular fiduciary principle or remedy can be applied.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>And he elegantly explains why banks do not owe fiduciary duties to their borrowers: \u201c<strong>No trust can, of course, exist where there is a debtor-creditor relationship: In equity, restitution stopped where repayment began<\/strong>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>L. S. Sealy, <em>Fiduciary Relationships<\/em>, 1962 Cambridge L.J. 69 (1962)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In a law review article published 50 years ago, Cambridge law professor L.S. Sealy reviewed two centuries of English case law on fiduciary relationships.\u00a0 He concluded, correctly, that different relationships give rise to different duties. As a starting point, \u201cFletcher Moulton L.J. once warned against what he called \u2018the danger of trusting to verbal formulae\u2019 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7,13,9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-764","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-law-reviews","category-legal-history","category-trusts-and-estates"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/764"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=764"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/764\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=764"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=764"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fresnolawyerblog.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=764"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}